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Penn: "Because I'm the Boss:" Employer Liability for Supervisors' Hosti

CASE COMMENT
"BECAUSE I'M THE BOSS:" EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
SUPERVISORS' HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT*
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998)
GrahamPenn**
Petitioner sued the City of Boca Raton, Florida (City) alleging that a
pattern of sexual harassment by her supervisors had created a sexually
hostile working environment.' Following a bench trial, a federal district
court found the City liable for the actions of the supervisors under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and awarded the Petitioner nominal damages. 2 The
district court found that the supervisors were acting as agents for the City
when they harassed the Petitioner, and the City, as their employer, was
vicariously liable for their actions.3
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to the
City's liability and the full court of appeals, sitting en banc, adopted the
panel's decision.4 The court of appeals rejected the finding that the
supervisors were acting as the City's agents and could find no other basis
to hold the City liable. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and in reversing the Eleventh Circuit, HELD that the supervisors were
acting as the City's agents and the City was liable for their actions.6
* Editor's Note: This Case Comment won the George W. Milam Outstanding Case
Comment Award for the Fall 1998 semester.
** This Case Comment is dedicated to my beautiful wife, Lara.
1. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2279 (1998). Petitioner sued under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida law. See id.
2. See id. at 2281. Title VII reads (in part): "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to ...discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1998).
3. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1563-64 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 1530 (1lth Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
Because the district court found the supervisors were acting as agents of the City, it noted that the
City's notice of the conduct was not required for liability to attach. See id.
4. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1539 (1lth Cir. 1997) (en banc).
5. See id. at 1537-38.
6. See Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2293. The instant Court granted certiorari due to the
divergence of approaches to the agency issue used by the courts of appeal following the Court's
opinion in Meritor.See id. at 2282. In Meritor, the Court instructed lower courts to look to the
common law of agency as demonstrated by sections 219-237 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY(1958) as aguidein determiningemployerliability in sexual harassment cases. SeeMeritor
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The Supreme Court first recognized "hostile environment" sexual
harassment as actionable discrimination under Title VII in the seminal case
of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.7 The petitioner in Meritor sued her
employer alleging a pattern of sexual harassment by her supervisor.8 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia's judgment that hostile environment sexual harassment was
actionable under Title VII. 9 The Court found that actions under Title VII
need not be limited to situations of "quid pro quo" harassment in which the
victim suffers some tangible employment detriment.1 0 Instead, the Court
held that sexual harassment which is severe enough to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment is actionable even absent a showing of
economic loss. 1
The MeritorCourt, however, declined to embrace the court of appeal's
judgment that employers should be held strictly liable for the sexual
harassment undertaken by their supervisory employees. 2 While rejecting
automatic employer liability for hostile environment harassment, the Court
also declined to rule under which circumstances employer liability will be
triggered. 3 Instead, the Court found that traditional agency principles, as
evidenced by the Restatement (Second) of14Agency, should be applied in
each case to determine employer liability.

Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
7. Meritor,477 U.S. at 66. The Court recognized that lower courts had been applying the
hostile environment theory since the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued
sexual harassment guidelines in 1980. See id. at 65; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982) (citing the 1980 EEOC guidelines in this analysis).
8. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 60.
9. See id. at 73.
10. See id. at 66-67.
11. See id. at 67. The MeritorCourt noted that the EEOC's 1980 Guidelines, which defined
the types of sexual harassment actionable underTitle VII, included behavior such as "'[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature."' Id. at 65 (quoting C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). The'Court also noted that every
harassment action will not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of a victim's
employment. See id. at 67. The Court, inHarrisv.ForkliftSystems, 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993), found
that the determination of whether an environment is hostile must be determined by looking at all
of the circumstances. The relevant factors may include "the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. The
HarrisCourt further noted that psychological injury is not required so long as the environment
"would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." Id. at 22.
12. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 73.
13. See id. at 72.
14. See id. The MeritorCourt relied on the amicus curiae briefs of the United States and the
EEOC. See id. at 71. The briefs argued that in hostile environment sexual harassment cases,
employers who have no actual knowledge of the harassment should be able to escape liability
through a showing that the employer has created an express policy against sexual harassment and
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The Eleventh Circuit followed the Meritorruling and applied agency
rules to determine employer liability in Sparks v. Pilot FreightCarriers,
Inc.' 5 The appellant in Sparks sought relief under Title VII, alleging that
her employer should be held liable for the hostile environment sexual
harassment she suffered at the hands of her supervisor. 6 The Sparks court
reversed the district court's summary judgment ruling for the employer
which had held that no common law agency relationship existed between
the supervisor and the employer.17
The district court in Sparks based its decision on the general rule of
agency which subjects employers to liability when employees are acting
within the scope of their employment." The district court found that the
supervisor was not acting within the scope of his employment when he
harassed the victim and thus, the employer should not be held liable for his
actions.' 9
The Sparks court ruled that the scope of employment rule was not
dispositive on the issue of employer liability.' Instead, it found a basis to
hold the employer liable under one of the exceptions to the scope of
employment rule in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.2" The court
focused on part of Restatement section 219(2)(d), which holds employers
liable for employee torts when "the servant purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority" or
the employee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relationship. 22 The court relied on the interpretation of section
219(2)(d) made by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
23 Under this interpretation,
(EEOC) in its amicus brief in Meritor.
supervisors act as employers' agents when they exercise the authority

a procedure to resolve any claims, and that the victim has failed to take advantage of the procedure.
See id. If the employer had knowledge of the harassment or no reasonable complaint procedure
existed, the briefs called for liability to attach. See id. The Meritor Court declined to adopt this
framework but agreed that agency principles are central to the determination of liability. See id. at
72.
15. 830 F.2d 1554,1558 (llthCir. 1987).
16. See id. at 1556.
17. See id. at 1558.
18. See id. To be within the scope of employment, the Restatement (Second) of Agency
requires the employee's conduct to "be of the kind he is employed to perform" "occur substantially
within authorized time and space limits," and "be actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve
the master." Id. at 1559 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 228(1) (1958)).
19. See id.at 1558. The district court found that the supervisor's conduct was not "actuated
by some purpose to serve" his employer and thus could not be within the scope of his employment.
Id.
20. See id. at 1559.
21. See id. at 1559-60.
22. Id. at 1559 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)).
23. See id.
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delegated to them by making or threatening to make decisions affecting the
employment status of their victims. 4
Applying this interpretation of section 219(2)(d), the Sparks court
found that the supervisor was acting as the employer's agent when he
harassed the victim.' The court found that evidence existed that the
supervisor used the authority delegated to him by the employer to harass
the victim, repeatedly reminding her that he was empowered to fire her if
she refused his sexual advances.26 Finding this evidence sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to the employer's liability, the court
reversed the summary judgment ruling.27 However, the Sparks court did
not address possible employer liability when a supervisor "neither
explicitly28 nor implicitly threatened to use his authority against the
victim."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found such a situation in Torres
v. Pisanoand declined to hold the employer liable. 29 The plaintiff in Torres
sought to hold her employer liable for the hostile environment sexual
harassment she received from her supervisor.3" The Torres court affirmed
the district court's summary judgment ruling that the employer was not
liable as a matter of law.3"
Applying a rule based on Restatement section 219(2)(d), the Torres
court determined that the supervisor did not use his authority to further the
harassment, nor was he aided in harassing the victim by the existence of

24. See id.; see also Meritor,477 U.S. at 70 (relying on the same interpretation).
25. See Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1559-60.
26. See id. at 1560.
27. See id.
28. Id. at n.9. The Sparks court also rejected the employer's claim that the victim's failure
to complain to anyone at the company about the harassment should shelter the employer from
liability. See id. at 1560. The court found that this argument was an attempt to rely on the dicta from
Meritor in which the Supreme Court mentioned, but failed to embrace, the liability limitations
included in the EEOC's brief. See id.; see also Meritor,477 U.S. at 71-72 (acknowledging that the
EEOC limitations could, but will not be applied). The court found that the EEOC's position that
employers with an explicit sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure can escape liability
if the victim fails to take advantage of the system was inapplicable to the case at hand. See Sparks,
830 F.2d at 1560. The Sparks court noted that the employer presented no evidence of the existence
of a sexual harassment policy or an effective grievance procedure. See id.
29. 116 F.3d 625,635 (2d Cir. 1997).
30. See id. at 628.
31. See id. The Torres court also summarized the rule in the Second Circuit as to employer
liability for harassment by supervisors. See id. at 633-34. First, employers will be liable if "the
supervisor was at a sufficiently high level in the company." Id. at 634. Employers will also be held
liable if "the supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to furtherthe harassment" or was aided
in harassing the victim by the agency relationship. Id. (footnote omitted). Employers who provide
"no reasonable avenue for complaint, or... knew (or should have known) of the harassment but
unreasonably failed to stop it" will also be deemed liable. Id. (footnote omitted).
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the agency relationship.32 The court rejected the view that the very
existence of the supervisory relationship aids harassment, because thejob's
responsibilities "provide proximity to, and regular contact with, the
victim. 3 3 Instead, the court reasoned that the victim must make a showing
existed between the harassment and the supervisor's
that a nexus
34
authority.
The Torres court found that the victim had not made such a showing. 5
The court ruled that a demonstration of "a more direct use of authority"
than the victim had presented would be required to hold the employer
liable for the supervisor's actions.36 The court failed, however, to provide
specific guidelines as to when the requisite level of authority had been
used. 7 Instead, the court relied on a series of case examples to show that
the plaintiff had not made an appropriate showing.38
The Supreme Court in the instant case clarified the standard for
employer liability for supervisors' actions in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases.39 The instant Court reviewed two possible grounds under
which employers could be held liable." First, the instant Court followed
the majority view of the courts of appeal and declined to embrace the
"scope of employment" theory.41 Instead, the instant Court adopted a

32. See id. at 635.
33. Id. (quoting Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391,1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Torres court emphasized that such an interpretation would lead the exceptions
contained in Restatement section 219(2)(d) to swallow the limitations of the scope of employment
rule and make all harassment within the scope of a supervisor's employment. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. The court found that if the victim's allegations were found true, she would be able
to show that the supervisor's harassment created a hostile work environment. See id. at 631.
36. Id. at 635. Of the supervisor's numerous alleged harassing words and actions, the Torres
court found none that directly threatened the victim's employment in any way. See id. at 628.
37. See id. at 635.
38. See id.The Torres court provided examples in which other courts had found a use of
These included situations in
authority that was direct enough to trigger employer liability. See id.
which a supervisor hinted that the employee was indebted to him for his assistance, see Karibian
v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,776 (2d Cir. 1994); a supervisor explicitly threatened the victim's
job, see Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1352-53 (4th Cir. 1995); and a supervisor
ordered other employees to harass the victim and also threatened retaliation on any employees who
complained, see DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 310, 315-16 (E.D.N.Y.
1996)). See id.
39. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275,2292-93 (1998).
40. See id. at 2286.
41. Id. at 2289-90. The instant Court ruled that treating harassment as within the scope of
employment of supervisors would endanger the traditional division between the course of
employment, and frolics and detours. See id. at 2288. The instant Court emphasized that some
sexual harassment may reasonably be found to be within the scope of employment, but a class exists
in which the supervisor had no intent to serve the interests of the employer. See id. at 2289. The
instant Court reasoned that this class of behavior should be classified as beyond the scope of
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theory of employer liability based on the second prong of Restatement
section 219(2)(d).42
The instant Court found that the "aided-by-agency-relation principle"
was an appropriate standard for determining employer liability in hostile
environment sexual harassment cases. 43 The instant Court reasoned that
three good reasons exist for holding employers liable for supervisors'
harassment.' First, the agency relationship allows the supervisor contact
with the victim.45 Second, actions by a supervisor "necessarily draw" upon
a superior position in a way that limits the ability of the victim to stop the
abuse.46 Third, the instant Court found that employers are in a better
position than co-employees to guard against harassment by supervisors.47
Despite the strong reasons the instant Court found for embracing an
interpretation of the aided-by-agency-relation standard, it recognized that
the standard might present a risk of automatic employer liability.4 Noting
that the Meritor Court explicitly held that automatic liability is
inappropriate, the instant Court discussed two alternative ways to counter
that possibility and stay within Meritor'sboundaries. 49 First, the instant
Court discussed and rejected a rule that would require "active or
affirmative... misuse of supervisory authority" before an employer could

employment. See id. The instant Court also found that to conceive of harassing behavior as always
within the scope of employment of supervisors would endanger the all but uniform rule of the lower
courts that harassment by co-employees falls outside the scope of employment. See id. The instant
Court found that the.rule as applied to co-employees would be seriously endangered if an expansive
view of supervisor's scope of employment were adopted. See id. But cf Kauffman v. Allied Signal,
Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding sexual harassment within the scope of
employment of supervisors who have significant input into personnel decisions of their victims);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that supervisors with
significant input into personnel decisions can be deemed "employers" under Title VII).
42. Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2290. The second prong of Restatement section 219(2)(d) allows
for an employer's vicarious liability when an employee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
43. Faragher,118 S. Ct. at2290.
44. See id. at 2291.
45. See id.
46. See id. The instant Court recognized that victims of co-employee sexual harassment can
often remove themselves from the situation or "tell the offender where to go." Id. On the other
hand, a victim ofa supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment may find it far more difficult
to offer the same response, given that the supervisor retains the power to affect the victim's
employment. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. The instant Court saw a real danger that a supervisor's authority could be seen as
aiding harassment in every case because an unspoken threat ofretaliation would always be present.
See id. With that interpretation, the instant Court feared that an employer could be found
automatically liable in the vast majority of cases. See id.
49. See id.
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be held liable." The instant Court found that such an "active-use" rule
would lead to disparate results in the lower courts given the difficulty in
determining what is an affirmative rather than implicit use of power.5 '
Because of the potential problems in determining when a supervisor is
actively using his authority, the instant Court noted that adopting an activeuse rule could also lead to more litigation.52
Instead of an active-use requirement, the instant Court adopted an
affirmative defense that an employer could raise to avoid liability
altogether for hostile environment sexual harassment.5 3 The affirmative
defense consists of two parts.54 First, the employer must show that it has
"exercised reasonable care" in avoiding and eliminating sexual harassment
in the workplace.55 The instant Court emphasized that the promulgation of
an anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure, while not a legal
necessity, may bear on the determination of whether the employer has
acted reasonably. 6 To meet the second requirement of the defense, the
employer must show that the victim of the harassment failed to act with
reasonable care to take advantage of safeguards the employer has put in
place. 7 The instant Court noted that showing an employee's unreasonable
failure to use an available complaint system could meet the employer's
burden on this element. 8
Thus, the Court in the instant case found that employers may be held
liable for the sexual harassment committed by their supervisory
personnel.59 The instant Court ruled that a direct supervisor will be deemed
to be acting as the agent of the employer when harassing a lower
employee.' In the case of hostile environment sexual harassment, the
an employer may raise an affirmative defense and thus
instant Court found
6
escape liability. '
The instant Court did what the MeritorCourt had previously refused to
do: dictate the boundaries of employer liability when supervisors are

50. Id. at 2291-92.
51. Seeid.
52. See id. at 2292.
53. See id. at 2293.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 2292-93.
60. See id. at 2293.
61. See id. The instant Court reemphasized that sexual harassment that results in tangible
employment detriment (quid pro quo sexual harassment) is not covered by the affirmative defense.
See id. For quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors, the instant Court would still hold
employers strictly liable. See id.
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responsible for hostile environment sexual harassment. 62 The instant Court
clarified Meritor's instruction to lower courts to "look to agency principles
for guidance" as to employer liability.63 The instant case also provided
needed guidance to employers seeking to avoid potential liability for
hostile environment sexual harassment.'
The instant Court's interpretation of the aided-by-agency-relation
standard of Restatement section 219(2)(d) represented a shift away from
the MeritorCourt's reluctance to rule definitively on employer liability.65
It also presented a differing interpretation of section 219(2)(d)'s provisions
than the circuit courts in Sparks and Torres.' The Sparks court adopted the
EEOC's interpretation of section 219(2)(d) and found that supervisors act
as agents of an employer when they explicitly use their authority by at least
threatening some employment action. 67 The Torres court, while not
limiting its interpretation to explicit threats on employment, insisted that
plaintiffs establish a nexus between the supervisory authority and the
harassment.68
The Court in the instant case, however, removed such considerations
entirely from the determination of employer liability.69 Under the instant
Court's framework, it is immaterial whether the supervisor specifically
threatened the victim's job, as in Sparks, or made no obvious use of
supervisory authority, as in Torres.7' The instant Court's rule would find
that the supervisors in both situations were acting as the employers' agents
when they harassed lower employees.71
Questions of whether supervisors are aided by the agency relationship
in harassing their victims are all but irrelevant to the determination of
employer liability in the wake of the instant case.72 Initial liability is
automatic, subject only to a successful invocation of an affirmative
defense.73 The instant case thus represents a shift from Meritor's "hands
off" treatment of the issue of employer liability.74 Instead of general
pronouncements on agency law's role, the instant Court provided lower

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (omitting a specific affirmative action defense).
Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2293.
See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2290-91.
See Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1559.
See Tores, 116 F.3d at 635.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
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courts with a clear rule.75 Whatever its other benefits, the rule of the instant
case should at least provide needed guidance to the lower courts and
restore a uniformity of approach to the issue.7 6
Besides providing guidance to lower courts, the instant Court's ruling
also provides needed advice to employers." The instant Court, while not
specifically requiring a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure,
found that the need for such a policy in the circumstances of a case may be
addressed in determining employer liability.7" This language presents a
framework for action to employers that fear being held liable for the
behavior of their supervisors.79
To avoid liability for hostile environment sexual harassment, the instant
Court seemed to imply that employers need only exercise reasonable care
in promulgating a sexual harassment policy and establishing a complaint
procedure. 0 As long as the employer's policy and procedures are adequate,
the instant Court seemed to imply that a plaintiffs failure to take
advantage of them will be deemed unreasonable."' This approach should
encourage employers to act proactively to prevent or repair violations in a
self-interested quest to avoid liability. 2 The instant Court's encouragement
of employer forethought should also limit the amount of litigation
surrounding the hostile environment sexual harassment issue.83 With
clearer legal standards in place, both employers and employees should be
in a better position to resolve harassment problems without resorting to the
courts. 84

In its first visit to the issue of hostile environment sexual harassment
since Meritor, the instant Court provided needed*clarity to both lower
courts and employers on the limits of employer liability. By replacing the

75. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
76. See id. at 2282.
77. See id. at 2292-93.
78. See id. at 2293.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. In applying the affirmative defense to the instant case, the instant Court found that
the City would not be able to raise it. See id. First, the City failed to disseminate the policy to the
beach employees. See id. Second, the City made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of its
supervisors. See id. Third, the City's policies did not allow victims to bypass harassing supervisors
to report the offensive conduct. See id. Overall, the instant Court found that the City could not have
exercised reasonable care as a matter of law. See id.; see generally Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (finding that existence of general grievanceprocedure and
victim's failure to invoke procedure did not insulate employer from liability for racial
discrimination charges).
82. See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
83. See id. The instant Court noted that encouraging employer forethought and "saving
action" by employees are two basic principles of Title VII. Id.
84. See id.
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vague call of Meritor to embrace agency law with a specific ruling, the
instant Court provided lower courts with a uniform standard that should
limit confusion and disparate verdicts. More importantly, the instant Court
also provided employers with vital guidance on how to avoid liability.
Employees also should benefit from the instant ruling because it
encourages employers to establish clear policies and complaint procedures.
In their self-interested attempt to avoid liability, employers will be more
likely to prevent or correct sexual harassment in the workplace, a
development from which employees will certainly benefit.
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